I have not been much of a success on dating apps. Like unread books in my library, these set of ‘romantic constructions’ just glare at me from my mobile screen hoping to be touched and looked into. Despite such blatant apathy I’m unable to delete them. I often find myself split into a binary while addressing a momentary excitation to just pull them off the roots. Rather, I often end up using them while thinking of doing the contrary. Why?
If you’ve ever followed my writing, you would know the river that I am. While flowing through territories of life, I often have people embarking upon me. And I; I carry them to their intended shores. However, the approaching spring of this year has put me to think about the larger question of self. What and where am I in all this processes I flow through?
I often defend my falling to the fact that I’m a human. I reduce my identity to a digital shot of a frozen smile snatched away from the moment it belonged to because a ‘prospect lover’ on the other side of the screen wants to ‘know me more’. Why? Because I’m a human. I make mistakes. I need to make my knees weak so that I can be held in alien arms. To be loved and understood in language and gestures that is not mine but I somehow construct to help others in understanding myself. And an excuse for all this and many more being – I’m a human!
It pains me to think that how conveniently we have alienated the idea of being self contented and emotionally strong to a metaphysical state of being. I’m expected to reach a sense of spirituality to put my life in order; spirituality which itself has been taken away from my own soul. This “meta-humanizing” of something so essential to our existence is anything but celebratory. To me, it is a construction of a digital world that has done to the idea of being human a slippage of meaning.
I think we need to understand this association of alienating oneself from one’s own answers with humanness is very dehumanizing. It is this illusion of humanity through which we have to look for the real one. And look no far but within. It is not your falling that makes you human but your strength to survive it. To me, it is that flicker of light I see in a distance, the only light in girthed darkness, and I know it is my calling. That flicker of light is no one but myself; moving a little away from this to reach a somewhere there.
What is music to our eyes? It is not the metaphorical use of the word for a visual aesthetic substance but an inquiry to understand the coordinated relationship between the two.
It is when the words drenched in rhythm are let loose on one’s senses that one realises the transcending nature of oneself. It is hardly conflicted that music holds potential to transcend our conscience of its physicality. So, how is it that we often find ourselves in a redundancy of materialism where the context of our physical presence does not resonate with our mental understanding of our own existence? Well, that is the extension that I’m seeking to establish here.
Gaston Bachelard, a celebrated French philosopher, talks about paradoxical nature of time. In his seminal work Intuition of the Instant he quite scientifically establishes the paradox of time in which time’s essence lies in duration, but creativity, in everything that breaks free from it. Duration and Time then come across as antithetical to each other. Duration, to Bachelard, is something that is continuous and creates an artificial distinction between present and future. To the contrary, time is something that is ‘instant’ or ‘in the moment’. Therefore, time is a severing away from the linearity of duration (something that he calls mutation) and can only be creative in the present.
It is Bachelard’s fascination with originality and uniqueness that makes him the centre of inquiry in this essay. To him, originality or creativity cannot be understood through Duration because in the realm of Duration, every moment has to have a connection with something in the past. Therefore, he argues that creativity can only happen when action (time) breaks away (sudden mutation) from the historicity of duration. So, the ‘time’ that exists at that moment of sudden mutation is the only action worth understanding and hence is natural. The other distinction of past and future is a mere artificial construction.
We can see the parallel of the same principle in Bachelard’s explanation of science. To him, science rests on an Epistemological Break which says that true creativity in the history of science is possible only when the history is discontinued and the past theory is negated at a particular time.
In the theory of Roupnel, something that Bachelard responded to in his work, art occupies a significant position. According to Roupnel, constant innovation (renewing mutation) is important for evolution and since art is created through original sensations, it becomes an ‘instant’ and hence occupies a key place in this process. In both of these explanations we see a great emphasis being put on the instantaneous nature of creativity, something which I would like to extend to the notion of existence within time.
Coming back to my hypothesis, I’m here to question what is the relationship of music with our eyes. Is it a mere artistic involvement or is it a higher process of transcendence that outs the very idea of existence and time into question?
When we listen to music, we make a choice. The choice, either consciously or subconsciously involves a selection, a song or a beat, that carries a meaning in itself. As a walker, I often listen to music when I’m travelling or walking from work to home or vice versa. So I can say that music is involved in my life when I already exist in a specific spacio-temporal milieu in time which is relative to my surroundings and is universal for each person around me. So it is also safe to say that the involvement of music in my life (for instance while walking from work to home) is a Duration (In Bachelard’s sense). “I listened to 5 songs while walking from work to home”, justifies the same. This principle might please Bergson but I say that it holds only to a voyeur.
The very idea that we choose a particular song at a particular moment speaks a lot about our cognition of letting an external output coordinate with an internal motivation of brain (neurophysiology argument). The decision making process of the brain, an emotional structure that involves hypothalamus and cerebral cortex, evidences that our music selection is a choice that involves a goal orientation approach. We choose a song which our limbic system and reticular formation tells us to be of a good yield in the past.
So it can be safely accepted that involvement of music in our life is mostly a choice. Therefore, it can be said that there is some sense of instantaneous action (sudden mutation) involved in our music listening practice. Hence, I would deduce that when we listen to music we are not just responding to what has happened in the past, or being just a point in the chain of Duration, but we are generating or experiencing something original and unique. We are living in Time and not Duration. Or it can be said, it is a real perception of time within a realm of Duration garbed as artificial Time.
Now, let’s extend this postulate to the question of one’s existence in the designated spacio-temporal environment. So the question that emerges is when I listen to music while travelling from work to home, do I exist in the time and space of my surroundings or do I transcend to a different instant of time. If I rely on the premise forwarded by Bachelard, my process of listening music is mutation from the historicity of the context around me. And since it’s a mutation, whatever is created during that process of listening music, through my cognitive methods, is original, hence creativity. So it would be safe to say that during the music listening process, I exist in Time and not Duration.
Now that my question of existence is sorted, I shall now move on to my question of creation. So, when I use my eyes while listening to music to envisage a deconstruction of the context around me, am I being an artist or maker of that process? Theodor Lipps in his radical hypothesis on art said that the power of an artwork doesn’t lie in the work itself. It is involved in the process where the viewer considers that artwork to be beautiful. It depends on what viewer makes of it. Hence, it is the viewer who becomes the artist of this new creative process. Extending Lipps postulate to the study of music, I realise the parallels can be drawn. Beethoven would not mean the same to the Liberal Arts students in Ukraine as what he stands for a 60 year old housewife in France. However, I do not stop at establishing semiotic nature of music. I want to take the liberty of extending it to the idea of construction (creativity). I believe that sometimes music becomes a catalyst to a higher creative process sourcing from ourselves. It is us who reach a moment in time where it is not the inherent meaning of the music that we are responding to but rather a new construction of meaning that forms a distinct artistic narrative. So it is when we listen to music that we are involved in a process of artistic construction (keeping in mind the Bachelard’s idea of mutation).
After analysing every inch of my mental curiosity, it would be good to condense my conclusion into a nutshell. I believe that when we listen to music (not as a voyeur) we divorce our existence from the spacio-temporal milieu of our surrounding and transcend to a new instant of time (since time has been proven to be relative). This instant of time is marked by a mutation from the Duration that we were involved in while not listening to music. It is in the instantaneous moment of music listening process that we are involved in a creative activity of forming original works (since art is premised on the freshness of original sensations and every moment in music listening process is mutated from any historical attachment). Thus, it is we who are the artist of this new artistic construction that is formed while we exist in space of time that is severed from the historicity of our physical surrounding in the context it exists.
. I feel empowered now of the fact that music no longer alienates me from my own artistic constructions. I wish I could put them down to concrete works of literature (sometimes I do though) but I get too consumed in the momentary meaning of my own constructions.
In the early scenes of L’avenir (Things to Come) we see a French artist resting in peace at a place where he wanted to consume himself to the music of winds and sea till the eternity. Commenting on the same, Heinz tells Nathalie that music is not only felt, it is seen. As the movie progresses, we see Nathalie experiencing the same contradiction, a semiotic rather, in her own self. We see her exploring and experiencing the various interpretations of herself, a development of an empathy she creates with the space and circumstances. In a cinematic construction that enables it, we see Nathalie oscillating from a life which she ‘thinks’ of being hers and the life she somehow indulges herself into. It is the fascinating movement of her identity from the past to the present to the future and the constant divergence of it all that made me question the idea of linearity and unity of life and identity.
Extrapolating Nathalie and contextualising her to the actress who ‘played’ that character on screen – Isabelle Huppert, I see an extension of this idea. In her interview to Stephen Colbert, when she was asked with a cliché of what is acting, she quite resolutely replied that it is anything but ‘acting’. She said that it is the denial of oneself as one exists in order to be someone else. This is something way more than merely method acting. This is a more psychological and physiological process of ‘looking-into’ the object of consideration. As the German Romantic philosophers or English Aesthetic School might call it active empathy, I would partially agree to that construction, only to extend it to a more complex idea of ‘living-into’.
I begin with the question of ‘self’. It’s an existential question that requires understanding of the two components or elements that are in a dialogical relationship in order to raise this doubt in the first place. Rachael Corbett raises this point while asking that if we work on an assumption that we consist of something self then what makes us think that the other is devoid of that self? In the present case the two components that I shall consider are – the actor and the character.
The uniqueness of cinematic empathy is that the object and subject are both representational of an interconnected signified. For instance, what it means to be a human is not only reflected in the artist but is also extended to the character. So, it would be a woman playing a role of a woman, or a man, so on and so forth. This nature of duality separates it from the Man and Nature duality of Johann Gottfried Herder. Unlike Herder’s association of ‘human elements’ such as consciousness to non-human elements such as nature; the characters possess humanness in themselves and the same is not artificially extended. This shall also be distinguished from David Hume’s concept of sympathy because there is no recognition of the ‘beauty’ of the character in either relative or absolute terms. Rather the nature of the character is not adjudged by the actor from any representational signifier. There can be slight similarities of this idea with the anthropomorphosis effect as elaborated in Friedrich Theodor Vischer’s operational symbolism, although the presence of magical-symbolism thinking in his theory is the one that frictions the synonymous relationship between the two.
Moving away from Vicher, there isn’t a consciousness of ‘self’ completely present during a cinematic process of acting. As Isabelle Huppert herself confessed in her interview to The Hollywood Reporter, ‘the moment and space of acting is not completely conscious or unconscious in the actor’s head. It is characterised by the state of mind where one is halfway lost of oneself and halfway in gain of someone else.” So Ms Huppert believes that an actor, during the process of acting, occupies a space (both physically and psychologically) that is separate from the socio-temporal space of the actor’s existence.
Desiree Navab (2004)
The idea that an actor can escape the ‘existence’ that is often synonymous to having a body and be someone else, it itches me to question this very synonymy. Occupation of a space would require some magnitude of mass in the thing that is occupying it. Therefore, it would be safe to say that the fact that a thing occupies a space, that it possesses mass, it henceforth exists. Since, an actor escapes to possess a space which is separate from the space occupied by her when she is not enacting a scene, it could be a plausible extension to say that she goes on to occupy a space that her body (body that she carries when she’s not enacting) does not occupy. So, the process of acting associates some sense of mass in the non-material existence of the idea of the character. It is this mass which is transferred to the actor when she escapes from the mass of the original body. The presence of mass in the non-material idea of the character would now lead us to believe that such an idea exists. Thus, the character itself exists. It may be non-material (devoid of body) but it exists. So much so, that it would safe to say that the character’s existence is independent, and perhaps, predates the existence of the actor.
Annegret Saldau (1976)
So, why did I recognise the existence of a non-material idea that possesses mass? Well, let’s talk about Descartes here. In his Meditation II, the French philosopher says that the reason that I doubt is because that I think. Therefore, there should be a thinking thing that exists. Since, I think, I am a thinking thing. Therefore, since I think, I exist. When it came to the question of body, he said that the only reason that I know the existence of body is due to perceptible sensations, which can possibly be the deception of the demon. But the fact that he thinks that whether his body exists or not shows that thinking thing (mind) exists. Thus, it is possible for him to exist even when he does not have a body because he has the thinking thing (mind). This duality between mind and body get further detailing in Meditations V and VI where he states that he knows that clear and distinct ideas are true. Therefore, every idea that he can conceive clearly and distinctively shall be true. Since he perceives mind and body to possess clear and distinct ideas, that is ‘thinking thing’ and ‘extension’ respectively, mind and body are two distinct things. Since, these are two different things; the existence of one does not depend on the existence of another.
I’m not saying that this theory completely follows the duality principle of Descartes, because saying so would mean that Leibniz’s Law of Indiscernible Identities would be a perfect criticism to it. On the contrary, The Leibniz Law is a plausible ally of this. The idea that two things that are completely distinct cannot resemble each other satisfies me to create a distinction between the character and the actor. Since there exist distinctions in the characteristics or properties of these two objects, we cannot say that the actor resembles herself or continues to carry the identity of herself while providing material existence (physicality) to the character. Although, the fact that the humanness of both the entities is not affected at all, or sometimes the language, voice or inhibitions continue to persist in the transformation, we cannot fixate the aforementioned Law of Indiscernible Identities here without certain meticulous reservations.
While pondering upon Leibniz, I went further ahead to the concept of ‘bringing about materialism or physicality to the idea of the character’. When the actor escapes the materiality of her original being, she goes on to provide the character her material existence. Well, how does this happen? I believe that the actor’s original body is a mere carrier of the identity that the actor represents. The idea of representation that works here is similar to the one present in the linguistic theory of Ferdinand de Saussure. He says that language is a system of signs where each sign is a combination of a form (signifier) and a particular meaning (signified). Moreover, the relationship that occurs between the signifier and the signified, that goes on to produce a linguistic sign, is created by a convention (usage). Let’s see this in the context of what we use to define ourselves? Or how we define ourselves? We don’t say that I am a particular person because I have a pair of legs and limbs. Perhaps, we don’t say that so as to reemphasise our understanding of identity which is something more than the animalistic existence and distinctive from others in some way.
Ferdinand de Saussure
The aforementioned argument proves that we have a perceived understanding of ourselves, of who we are, of our existence, which is based on the way we represent ourselves through language. So for instance, if I begin to think about my friend or a colleague in their absence, I would use representational signs of a language to make sense of their existence. ‘He’s very funny’, ‘she’s quite witty’, all of these sentences reduces our existence to a representational system based on language that focuses more on how we ‘come across’ than what we ‘consist of’. This further enables me to think that if it is our representation that defines our existence, then such existence can be understood beyond the presence of the body itself. Therefore, it can be concluded that the body is a mere carrier of an actor’s identity and when she enters the process of ‘becoming’ a character, the same body becomes a material representation of the identity of the character.
Since, I have established the duality of identity and body and the transformation of material representation from the actor to the character, there is not much left for me to deliberate upon but to reckon. So this is what I think it is – when an actor chooses to take up a certain character, she enters a process of becoming where she moves away (hence denies) from the existence (if existence depends on recognition of itself) of her original identity in order to give existence to the identity of the character. The spacio-temporal existence and reality of the transformed actor (character) is separate from that of the original actor (we can probably say that it replaces the space occupied by the actor for that moment of enactment). The now existent mind of the character gets its body with the material transfer of mass from the actor to the character (since body is nothing but a carrier of identity). Therefore, during the process of a scene, it is the character that exists and not the actor. The reality is associated with the cinematic construction and not the contrary.
Since everything has been said quite contently, I cannot help but raise few questions by keeping this theory as a premise. One of the most prominent of them being that if it is the character that exists during the shooting of a scene, and not the actor then who should get the remuneration that flows from the aesthetic appreciation of that art? Is it justified to create a personality cult around the original figure of the actor when it is the figure of the character that created that psyche among the masses? This, and a lot more triggers my mind for further deliberations and inquiry.
I haven’t lost myself in a life
Called work, not chained
To impersonal commitments, I
Have just shed a skin
Of life, out of many
That I’ve been wearing for so long
I thought I lived once,
A life, a person, an
All this, until
I saw myself no more
And found everything of me
When the languages begin
To dissipate through
The sieve of unanswered prayers,
Of many unfulfilled desires,
We can still see each other
Not through meanings but
When everything would fail to make sense,
I would not be afraid, for I
Sense your presence somewhere near,
Outside but within,
Unheard, unseen, unspoken
But just felt
For we exist
“…The fact that we breathe, live a life and are God to our children means that we have a story and it deserves to be told…”
There cannot be a contention to a thought that Viola Davis offered a memorable performance in the cinematic adaptation of August Wilson’s iconic play Fences. Even though her performance underlines her underappreciated presence in Hollywood, the subject matter of her character in the movie is a more fascinating discourse to delve into. Starting from the very decision of adapting a play into a movie to the definitive selection of screenplay and uncoloured construction of dialogues, the presence of this movie and especially of Viola Davis’s interpretation of the idea that it represents comes across as a major challenge to the established traditions of storytelling in American cinema.
When Viola Davis began to deliver her winning speech at Screen Actors Guild Awards (2017), she quite distinctively mentioned the word ‘history’. While expressing what this recognition means to her and to the idea that this film stands for, she said that it is not often that a movie is made to display the story of an average man who happened to be a man of colour. The speech delivered by Viola Davis is a direct attack to the concept of theorizing prevalent practice in both literary and historical studies known as the Great Man Tradition.
Credits: Huffington Post
Coined by the 19th century historian and commentator Thomas Carlyle, the Great Man Tradition in historical studies is a concept that chooses to understand history from the existence of the ‘great men’ who had occupied decisive and substantially prominent or heroic positions in the society. Such was the conviction of Carlyle that in his book titled On Heroes, Hero-Worship and Heroics of History, he goes on to comment that the ‘history of the world is nothing but the biography of great men’. This idea resonates in Machiavellianism as well which stands of inculcating duplicity and cunningness in general conduct or statecraft. The idea of looking at history from the lens of who is termed as a ‘hero’ focuses on making a retrospective study an instrument for guiding the socio-cultural development of future actions and psyche. The understanding of the nature of history itself has been shortened at one hand by focusing the subject matter on certain prominent figures and on the other hand it has been displayed to be widened by associating it with the understanding of present dogmatic trends and the construction of some kind of future course of action.
There have been many criticisms to this tradition mainly coming from the realms of feminism and Marxist studies. However one that mounted the most was the one given by scientist and sociologist Herbert Spencer who refuted to see these ‘heroes’ in an isolated form. To Spencer, these cult personalities do not occupy these positions on their own or do not exist outside the social relations of their society. It is the social factors prevailing at that time that create a favourable or enabling environment for certain figures to occupy influential positions. So, when Hollywood period dramas celebrate Jackie Kennedy or Lincoln, they get quite deferential by not focusing much on the role played by sociological forces in the construction of personality cult around these figures. However, the practice of building a climax and anti-climax in the narrative of the art has somehow pushed the movies slightly away from the great man practice, but only procedurally and not substantially.
It is in this backdrop that Viola Davis, in front of the entire fraternity, proclaims that the stories of an average man or woman deserve to be in the canon of any narrative that has been built out there. She is reiterating the process of alleviating the common person to the books of history or probably the democratization of the discourse on history itself. The character that she plays is a prejudiced class within a class that has been systematically prejudiced. The slow or ‘real’ movement of her body and corresponding emotions in the space of performance represents the plight of dialectic of sex that has haunted the fight for gender equality since generations. She is painstakingly ‘natural’ and she wants us to know that how unfair this ‘naturalization’ is. This plight and the outburst that followed is a political statement in itself. Through Rose, Viola Davis brings drama at the doorsteps of a minority household; a set of cinematic expressions to the unexpressed desires of a coloured woman.
Credits: Vanity Fair
As Viola Davis went on to thank her husband and her daughter, and as crowd was left with no choice but to applaud, I could not help myself but think what we have done to deserve an actor like her. Even before Fences, her Oscar nominated performances in The Doubt and The Help reflect her sheer commitment to break away from the great man tradition of storytelling. And as the recognition comes ridiculously late, I hope the very coming of it will also bring the change in the way cinema chooses to represent itself in the cultural industry.
I think I always conflicted with an idea of having a single identity. One name, one man, all leading to one destiny. I’ve always seen myself as a diacritical sort of a human. One that grows to fill certain voids, then go on to outgrow those very voids in search of other. It is in the fluidity of meanings, the ever evolving spaces of reality, that I find some sort of sense. Maybe, my peace lies not in rest but in mobility.
As I take slow sips of my hazelnut latte, extra caffeine and not usual, I don’t find my answers in the space that presents itself to be real to my senses. I find it in the melodies of old Hindi songs. As I feel the long raked up unfinished thoughts surfacing to scratch the walls of my brain, and probably my heart, I immerse myself in a dialogue with the voice of Lata Mangeshkar. I don’t think I can ever restrict her songs to compartmentalized meanings of aesthetics. Like my own identity, I see these songs transcending structures of predefined voids and conquered territories of reason. I see them forming a new representation system that feels personally customized to engender within me this catharsis of sorts which is not of heightened degrees of emotions but of calming sensibilities. I can feel my thoughts getting reorganized, things being cleaned and sorted, and during this process, emergence of some lost things that I don’t even remember losing but recognize their importance. This voice, these songs, are nothing less than a revelation to me.
So, as I wait for my another cup of coffee, I don’t expect to be called out with my real name. Yes, I have multiple Starbucks names. I don’t know whether it’s even significant or not but it feels good to be someone else for a while. No matter even it is for few seconds. Well, why call it being someone else? To those who tend to outgrow, this is just an another form of being oneself.
It’s seldom that humans become metaphors of their own language. It’s not quite often that we see things being defined in the person itself. However, when it happens, when we do witness a thing being definitive in itself, we see the thing itself and not its representation. We don’t have to concern ourselves with imitations anymore for we, upon such witnessing, reconstruct the constant. We realign the history, mend our explanations, and create this new allegory of essence upon which essence in others thereupon be searched for. And, when we’re done with that momentary reconstruction of truth, the only constant, all that is left is the representation that engenders faith in generations to come.